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ABSTRACT  
A Novel Approach: Religious Epistemology in Marilynne Robinson’s Gilead.  
(April 2010) 
 
Jonathan David McGregor 
Department of English 
Texas A&M University 
Research Advisor: Dr. Hugh J. McCann 
Department of Philosophy 
 
 
Marilynne Robinson's Pulitzer prize-winning novel Gilead is preoccupied with religious 
epistemology. Protagonist John Ames, an aging and ill Congregationalist preacher in 
1950s small town Iowa, maintains his Christian belief in spite of his father, brother, and 
godson all rejecting the faith. Ames' engagement with modern skeptical reasoning does 
not prompt a recourse to apologetics, however: Ames emphatically denies that argument 
is up to the task of authenticating belief in God. His epistemology grounds faith in 
religious experience, what Robinson calls "the shock of revelatory perception." Ames 
has a way of seeing the world as obviously alight with the grace and glory of God. The 
faculty for perceiving God in experience is not unique to Ames; it is a universal human 
endowment also universally suppressed because of original sin. Only divine grace can 
repair one’s mind to perceive God rightly. Robinson and Ames inherit this epistemology 
from the Reformation theologian John Calvin, whose reputation in cultural history 
Robinson is trying to resurrect, beginning with her 1998 essay collection The Death of 
Adam. In my research, I uncover the way that this Calvinist epistemology is at work in 
Gilead under the aspects of perception, sin, and grace. I engage with Calvin, Robinson's 
non-fiction, and recent articulations of Calvinist epistemology in the field of analytic 
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philosophy by Alvin Plantinga. Robinson’s conflict with the “New Atheists” provides a 
cultural context for Gilead: The way she understands Christian belief is not vulnerable to 
New Atheist arguments because of a deep disjunction at the level of metaphysics. Gilead 
embodies an experience-based religious epistemology “for the rest of us,” the great bulk 
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We were a strange pair for secular Britain, an Australian Jew and an American Calvinist 
sharing drinks and stories in the Cambridge bar. Outside in the ancient darkness, rental 
punts bobbed and clacked in the river Cam. You could drop a few quid on one of those, 
push it upriver to Grantchester and take tea at The Orchard with the ghosts of Woolf and 
Wittgenstein. I had been there a couple of weeks before, but I took the hour walk 
through the grassy fens instead.  
 
At the end of a Formal Hall in Pembroke College, the lecturer for my “Art, Emotion, and 
Morality” class had asked if he could buy me a drink. Flattered, I accepted, even though 
I had already had a couple of glasses of wine and did not hold my liquor too well. We 
had walked down Mill Street and found this modern place by the river with a wall of 
windows. I asked for a half of Guinness and sipped it carefully while he sucked down a 
cocktail. We talked about literature (his favorite novel, at least at the time, was Kazuo 
Ishiguro’s The Remains of the Day), and we talked about the final paper I had just turned 
in for his class. Somehow, maybe because my paper was on fiction and moral education 
and used C.S. Lewis’ The Abolition of Man as a starting point, we ended up on the 
subject of sin. We talked about the first few chapters of Genesis, that what he saw most  
____________ 
This thesis follows the style of Contemporary Literature.  
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clearly in those pages was the establishment of the rhythm of the Sabbath. The salient 
thing I saw there was the radically broken nature of rebellious humanity and our need for 
redemption. He said I sounded like John Calvin, and I grinned. He told me he knew of a 
book I might like, and before I left Cambridge, he put a copy of Gilead by Marilynne 
Robinson in my hand.  
 
Marilynne Robinson, Calvinist novelist 
Robinson is as anomalous on the landscape of contemporary literature as my lecturer and 
I were in Cambridge. She told one interviewer, “I’ve written about Idaho, plutonium and 
Calvinism, and now a dying pastor in Iowa. If any writer has ever courted obscurity, 
surely I have” (Hoezee). The book about Idaho is her first novel Housekeeping, one of 
TIME Magazine’s top one hundred novels of all time (Grossman and Lacayo). It was 
published in 1980 to much critical acclaim and made into a well-regarded film. After 
Housekeeping, Robinson took a nearly 25-year hiatus from novel-writing, publishing 
two works of non-fiction in the interval. The first of these, the plutonium book, was 
Mother Country: Britain, the Welfare State, and Nuclear Pollution, an exposé of 
Britain’s Sellafield nuclear plant. It was released in 1989, the same year she started 
teaching at the Iowa Writer’s Workshop (Appleyard).  
 
Though Robinson grew up Presbyterian, and later shifted “the doctrinal and 
demographic inch” to Congregationalism, as she says in her essay “Psalm Eight” (Death 
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231), it was teaching a class on Moby-Dick at the Iowa Workshop that led her to study 
theology, and to Calvin in particular: 
 [Moby-Dick] is so filled with theology that I decided I should read the theology it 
 would most likely be responding to. So I read Calvin’s Institutes. Not only did 
 this greatly illuminate my reading of Melville, and his contemporaries, it also 




This theological re-education issued in her book on Calvinism, a 1998 collection of 
essays entitled The Death of Adam. The essays range from an attack on the reductionist 
worldview of neo-Darwinists like Daniel Dennett, to celebrations of Dietrich Bonhoeffer 
and American Puritanism, to achingly beautiful autobiographical reflections. But it is the 
project of recovering and rehabilitating Calvin from “learned-looking books...[that] 
indicate in their allusions to him [no] better knowledge than what folklore can provide of 
what he thought and said” that unites the collection (12). Robinson’s re-appropriation of 
Calvin also motivates her two latest novels, 2004’s Gilead and 2008’s Home. 
 
Gilead and Home are companion pieces, centering on the same major events and passage 
of time from two different perspectives. Gilead is a letter from 76-year-old John Ames, a 
dying Congregationalist pastor, to his young son, intended to be read when the boy 
grows up. Ames takes account of his life to transmit an account of “what matters” (116). 
The project is complicated when Ames’ namesake godson, John Ames “Jack” Boughton, 
a sort of prodigal with a haunted, lonely past, comes home. Ames struggles out loud in 
the letter with unforgiveness and jealousy as Jack befriends his young wife Lila. Ames 
eventually comes to a deeper understanding of grace in preparation for death and finds a 
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way to forgive Jack. Home tells the story of Jack’s homecoming from inside the 
Boughton household (Jack’s father, the Presbyterian minister in town, is Ames’ best 
friend), taking the perspective of Glory, Jack’s older sister. 
 
The novels are beautiful. Bryan Appleyard in The Sunday Times has called Robinson 
“the world’s best writer of prose,” and with the rhythm and grace present on the pages of 
Gilead and Home it is not hard to understand why. But they are also weighty with grand 
concepts and an uncommon, joyful seriousness that I attribute to Robinson’s theological 
vision. Mona Simpson in the Atlantic called Gilead “a beautiful book of ideas.” It is 
Puritanical in the best of ways, like Jonathan Edwards’ exultant description of creation 
as the product of the overflow of infinite love within the triune being of God, made for 
the very purpose of enjoying the perfections of its Creator. Robinson says in the 
introduction to The Death of Adam, “I want to overhear passionate arguments about 
what we are and what we are doing and what we ought to do. I want to feel that art is an 
utterance made in good faith by one human being to another” (4). Gilead is such an 
utterance, and it contains some of those passionate arguments. Race is one of its great 
themes: Abolitionists founded Gilead, Iowa in the days of bleeding Kansas, and Jack 
Boughton’s deepest secret is that he has married and fathered a child with a black 
woman. More overtly religious ideas like grace, faith, forgiveness, predestination, sin, 
and the sacredness of the human being and of everyday experience compose Gilead’s 
whole atmosphere.  
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Laura Tanner has written that “much remains to be said...about the significance of 
religion in Gilead,” and I hope to address the subject worthily in this project (231n3). 
When I read Gilead for the first time, holed up Christmas 2008 by a fireplace under 
record Colorado snowfall, Ames’ response to skepticism captured my imagination. Jack 
Boughton, Ames’ own inverted reflection—mean, hangdog, abashed, faithless—comes 
early to the sanctuary one Sunday morning, and the questions Jack puts to Ames forces 
him to defend his Christian belief. I was taught growing up that in such a situation, one 
was to reach for standard apologetic arguments for the existence of God, the reliability 
of the Scriptures, and so on, to make Christianity appear more reasonable to the skeptic. 
Not so Ames. The old preacher, moved to tears by a force he cannot quite name, 
launches into a poetic description of his little sanctuary “full of silence and prayer,” a 
beautifully rendered account of common religious experience (197). He then 
deconstructs in the next few pages the usual practice of apologetics, of responding to 
skepticism with “proofs” of God and of Christian affirmations.  This reveals that a 
different religious epistemology is at work in Gilead than that assumed in the practice of 
traditional apologetics:1 The epistemology at work in Gilead sees experience, not 
argument, as crucial for coming to and authenticating knowledge of the Christian God.2 
 
 
                                                
1 For a current, popular example of the epistemology that sees “natural theology,” the giving of proofs for 
God, as critical, see the article “God Is Not Dead Yet” by the philosopher William Lane Craig in 
Christianity Today, July 3, 2008.  
2 Robinson wrote me in an e-mail that her qualms with apologetics do in fact lay at the level of 
epistemology: “I do tend to believe there is a problem with apologetics, a category mistake.  A false model 
of knowledge and belief as they have God as their subject.” 
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Gilead and religious epistemology 
Epistemology is the branch of philosophy dealing with knowledge. Epistemologists ask 
questions like: What is knowledge? How do we come to know things? Do we actually 
know anything at all? Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy stands out as one of 
the most famous and critical epistemological projects in Western philosophy. Descartes 
determined to doubt (in his view) everything that could be doubted, stripping away 
whole classes of beliefs by calling his faculties of sense perception and mathematical 
reasoning into question, arriving finally at one indubitable truth: “I think, therefore I 
am.” From this foundation, Descartes attempted to reconstruct human knowledge. 
Criticisms of his dubiously successful rebuilding method, and criticisms of the 
criticisms, are the story of modern Western epistemology. In the last fifty years, the 
British and American analytic tradition of epistemology has paid particular attention to 
the problem of “justification”: Under what circumstances is a person entitled to hold a 
particular belief? What makes a person justified, or rational, in believing something?  
 
Religious epistemology concerns religious knowledge. The questions here are more 
specific: Is God knowable? How do we come to have knowledge of God? What entitles 
a person to religious beliefs? Is belief in God ever justified, and under what 
circumstances? In the Western tradition, these questions have often been aimed at 
Christian beliefs and the Christian God. Religious epistemology looms very large in 
Gilead, and takes up quite a bit of Ames’ discourse in his letter to his son. “There are 
two insidious notions,” he writes, “from the point of view of Christianity in the modern 
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world...One is that religion and religious experience are illusions of some sort 
(Feuerbach, Freud, etc.), and the other is that religion itself is real, but your belief that 
you participate in is an illusion” (165). These “two insidious notions” raise the questions 
of what makes belief rational and how one comes to knowledge of God. But Ames does 
not answer them the way one might expect, by reaching for apologetic arguments to 
display the reasonableness of Christianity. “And they want me to defend religion, and 
they want me to give them ‘proofs.’ I just won’t do it...In the matter of belief, I have 
always found that defenses have the same irrelevance about them as the criticisms they 
are meant to answer,” he says, emphatically denying that argument is up to the task of 
either justifying or invalidating religious belief (202-203). Rather, “it is religious 
experience above all that authenticates religion, for the purposes of the individual 
believer” (165-166).  
 
Defusing modern skeptical reasoning is central to Ames’ project of transmitting the 
truths of life to his son. He writes, “Many of the attacks on belief that have had such 
prestige for the last century or two are in fact meaningless. I must tell you [his son] this, 
because everything else I have told you...loses almost all its meaning and its right to 
attention if this is not established” (164). But rather than reaching for argument, as might 
be expected, Ames grounds his defense of Christianity in religious experience. What can 
Robinson mean by this? How does religious epistemology work in Gilead? And why 
write about this in our current cultural moment? These questions drive the burden of my 
research. In this thesis, I explicate the religious epistemology of Gilead according to a 
  8 
framework of perception, sin, and grace, the three concepts from Calvin’s theology that 
Virginia Tech English Professor Thomas Gardner identifies as shaping Robinson’s 
“literary vision” (1). As I do this, I situate Gilead in the tradition of Calvinist 
epistemology through engagement with Calvin, Robinson’s non-fiction, and a recent 
articulation of Calvinist epistemology in the field of analytic philosophy by Alvin 
Plantinga. Finally, I draw my own conclusions about the success of Robinson’s project 
and tease out some of Gilead’s implications, as well as offering some suggestions for 















  9 
CHAPTER II 
GILEAD’S METAPHYSICS OF PERCEPTION 
 
For Marilynne Robinson, epistemology is inextricably bound up with metaphysics. That 
is to say that the questions of what we know and how we know it (epistemological 
questions) can only be answered in the context of a conception of what exists or what the 
world is like (metaphysical conceptions). She writes in the introduction to The Death of 
Adam:  
 It all comes down to the mystery of the relationship between the mind and the 
 cosmos. Those who would employ reductive definitions of...reality credit their 
 own perceptions of truth with fundamentalist simple-heartedness.... Is it not in 
 fact a very naive conception of reality, and of its accessibility to human 
 understanding, that would exclude so much of what human beings have always 
 found meaningful, as if by this means fallibility or error or delusion could be 
 localized and rejected? 
(3) 
Robinson has in mind here neo-Darwinists like Daniel Dennett and Richard Dawkins, 
who apply natural selection willy-nilly as a theory of everything from economics to 
cultural phenomena to morals and decry religion as the primary source of human misery 
and error.3 Dawkins, for example, proposes that religion is the unfortunate by-product of 
our otherwise helpful adaptations, like a tendency to obey and believe our elders or to 
fall in love (Delusion 200-217). Psychological facts about the similarity of religious 
belief to trusting our elders or falling in love cannot, of course, prove a causal 
relationship between the processes. Furthermore, explaining away religion with such 
                                                
3 See, for example, Dawkins’ neo-Darwinian explanation of morality in The God Delusion 245-254. 
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facts presupposes a metaphysic of stark naturalism—a conception of “the relationship 
between the mind and the cosmos” based on mere genetic survival that actually denies 
the mind any robust reality. It is important to note that naturalism is presupposed by 
Dawkins, not demonstrated or argued for. How could one hope to prove such a thing as 
naturalism, that nothing non-physical exists?4 But more on this in Chapter IV, where I 
will further consider the confrontation between Robinson and the New Atheists. Suffice 
it to say, for now, that an epistemology implies a metaphysic, and Robinson gets both 
from John Calvin.5 
 
Robinson expresses her sense of Calvin’s metaphysics and its bearing on his 
epistemology in her preface to John Calvin: Steward of God’s Covenant. From Calvin’s 
Institutes she gathers a definite conception of the mind’s relation to the cosmos and, 
even more, its relationship to the Creator of the cosmos and of itself: “It is as if we were 
to find a tender solicitude toward us in the fact that the great energy that rips galaxies 
apart also animates our slightest thoughts...The first assertion of Calvin’s theology, both 
in order and in centrality, is the continuous, unmediated character of the relationship 
between God and any human soul” (xvi-xvii). This is Robinson’s Calvinist metaphysic; 
it is a conception of the way things are. The world is made for human beings to live and 
perceive and know in, however limited our knowledge may be, and the primary thing 
that we experience and know is the immediate presence of God.  
                                                
4 Indeed, how could one prove any metaphysic? 
5 “The religious epistemology in Gilead expresses my understanding of Calvin,” Robinson wrote me in an 
e-mail. 
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 Calvin never pauses to dignify the question of the existence of God. To him God 
 is simply manifest.... Calvin’s implicit reply to those who denounced the 
 subjectivism of the beliefs he defended is that God himself chooses to engage 
 human consciousness thus intimately, that to do so is his being toward us, and 
 that to feel the presence and the meaning of his attention is our being toward him. 
 It is important to note that this is a metaphysics consistently explored and 
 developed throughout Calvin’s writing. And it is an epistemology. 
(xx-xxi) 
This metaphysic puts “the felt experiences of individual knowing and perceiving,” what 
she deems “the basis of  [Calvin’s] theology and of his metaphysics,” front and center 
for Robinson’s own religious epistemology (xii). In an interview, Robinson argues from 
Calvin’s relational metaphysics, in which “the omnipotence of God is understood by him 
as, so to speak, the dynamic of being, the continuous recreation that continuously 
expresses the being of God,” to an understanding of “experience as encounter” (Hoezee). 
Because everything that exists expresses the being of God, we are continuously 
confronting Him, unavoidably encountering Him in every experience. Robinson says 
that this leads to asking of our experience, “What am I being given to see, to 
understand?” In other words, it leads us to perception. We might best organize it like 
this: Human beings primarily come to knowledge of God through the felt experience of 
perceiving His presence in themselves, in the world, and in other people.6  
                                                
6 In the Hoezee interview, Robinson connects Calvin’s metaphysics to the doctrine of the imago Dei: “Any 
person one encounters is an image of God...with all it implies about the astonishing privilege of being 
given the occasion to encounter such an image, and to honor and comfort. This...is central to Calvin’s 
metaphysics of encounter.” This shows how Calvin’s theology holds together not only metaphysics and 
epistemology, but ethics, too, as inextricable. Encountering another human being and perceiving in them 
the image of God implies the responsibility to honor and to comfort. I think this ability to hold the three 
major branches of philosophical thought in an organic unity is something like what Robinson had in mind 
when she offered the explanatory power of “major theology” as a reason for her faith: “The scale of 
thinking and the power of integration that [major theologians] are capable of from thinking in that scale is 
something that is really unique to theology. Given the assumptions that theologians proceed from, they are 
so much more capable of making meaningful articulations about what things are, what it is to exist, the 
experience of moral life, and so on....Nothing else touches it” (Abernathy). 
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John Ames, the narrator of Gilead, has a keen sense of metaphysics about him, too. He 
quotes George Herbert’s “For Preservation is a Creation, and more, it is a continued 
Creation, and a Creation every moment” with approval, which harkens back to 
Robinson’s idea of a “continuous recreation that continuously expresses the being of 
God” (126). He is always going on about “existence” and “Being,” as in this passage: “I 
have been thinking about existence lately. In fact, I have been so full of admiration for 
existence that I have hardly been able to enjoy it properly” (64). And again, later in the 
book: 
 We participate in Being without remainder. No breath, no thought, no wart or 
 whisker, is not as sunk in Being as it could be. And yet no one can say what 
 Being is. If you describe what a thought and a whisker have in common, and a 
 typhoon and a rise in the stock market, excluding “existence,” which merely 
 restates the fact that they have a place on our list of known and nameable things 
 (and which would yield as insight: being equals existence!), you would have 
 accomplished a wonderful thing, still too partial in an infinite degree to have any 
 meaning, however. 
(203) 
This is the literary expression of Robinson’s Calvinist vision of a world shot through 
with the wonder of God. And as we might expect, given Robinson’s notion of the 
intertwined-ness of metaphysics and epistemology, Gilead’s conception of the 
knowledge of God follows suit. The very passage just quoted is part of Ames’ argument 
against “proofs” of God.  
 
Laura Tanner, in her article “‘Looking Back from the Grave’: Sensory Perception and 
the Anticipation of Absence in Marilynne Robinson’s Gilead,” writes that “reviewers 
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who read Gilead as a celebration of the force of human consciousness in the face of 
death located the novel’s power not just in its philosophical and religious vision but in its 
immersion in the sensory details of lived experience” (228). Tanner thinks that Ames 
renders sense experience so powerfully because of “how dying shapes the sensory and 
psychological dynamics of human perception,” and she employs neuroscience research 
to illustrate her point. Unquestionably this kind of thing is going on in Gilead; 
impending death and the prospect of the next world sharpen Ames’ experience of this 
one. “When you read this,” he writes to his son, “I am imperishable...not waiting for 
you, though, because I want your dear perishable self to live long and to love this poor 
perishable world, which I somehow cannot imagine not missing bitterly” (60-61). But I 
think Tanner puts up a false dichotomy between Gilead’s “philosophical and religious 
vision” and its “immersion in the sensory details of lived experience.” It is rather 
Gilead’s Calvinist epistemology, founded on its Calvinist metaphysics, that lends the 
novel its intense perceptive force, however heightened by Ames’ approaching death. 
Robinson told The Paris Review, “One Calvinist notion deeply implanted in me is that 
there are two sides to your encounter with the world. You don’t simply perceive 
something that is statically present, but in fact there is a visionary quality to all 
experience. It means something because it is addressed to you.... You can draw from 
perception the same way a mystic would draw from a vision” (Fay). The question 
remains, what is the other side of Ames’ perception? What is it in his perceptual 
experience that marks the world as burdened with the presence of God? 
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Beauty 
The beauty of the world deeply impresses Ames. He speaks rapturously of his son: 
“Your hair is straight and dark, and your skin is very fair. I suppose you’re not prettier 
than most children. You’re just a nice-looking boy, a bit slight, well scrubbed and well 
mannered. All that is fine, but it’s your existence I love you for, mainly. Existence seems 
to me now the most remarkable thing that could ever be imagined” (60). The particulars 
of sense perception, his son’s features, move Ames to a sense of the goodness of Being 
in general, of all creation. Even a non-human collage of late-summer imagery receives a 
loving aesthetic treatment from Ames’ pen.  
Oh, these late, strange riches of the summer, these slab-sided pumpkins and 
 preposterous zucchinis. Every wind brings a hail of acorns against the roof. Still, 
 it is mild. For a while the spiders were building webs everywhere, and now those 
 webs are all blown to shreds and tatters, so I suppose we can imagine well-fed 
 spiders tucked up in the detritus of old leaves, drowsing away the very thought of  
toil. 
(218) 
Andrew Brown writes in The Guardian, “The link between joy and beauty and the 
apprehension of God is one which is very vivid in Robinson.... ‘One of the things that 
has really struck me, reading Calvin,’ she said then, ‘is what a strong sense he has that 
the aesthetic is the signature of the divine.’” 
 
Ames’ worldview is so infused with this idea that he apes Calvin in his description. Take 
a look at this passage from Calvin’s Institutes: “And, first, wherever you turn your eyes, 
there is no portion of the world, however minute, that does not exhibit at least some 
sparks of beauty; while it is impossible to contemplate the vast and beautiful fabric as it 
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extends around, without being overwhelmed by the immense weight of glory” (51). Now 
compare that with this passage from Gilead: “Wherever you turn your eyes the world 
can shine like transfiguration. You don’t have to bring a thing to it except a little 
willingness to see. Only, who could have the courage to see it?” (280) Ames follows 
Calvin in his sense that it is the glory of God that addresses him in the beauty of 
creation, the aesthetic quality of all existence.  
 
But how does this work? It could be a kind of sneaky teleological argument, running 
something like this: The beauty and complexity of Creation betrays intentionality.  
Intentionality must be the product of a willful Mind. A Mind great enough to conceive 
the order and beauty of galaxies must be very great indeed. This vastly intelligent, 
powerful, and creative Mind we call God.7 An argument like that, however, is not at all 
what Robinson intends. She writes, “To say that the order of nature reveals divine intent 
is one thing, and to say that the beauty that floods our senses has the meaning of vision 
and revelation is another.... The beauty of what we see is burdened with truth. It signifies 
the power of God and his constant grace toward the human creature. It signifies the 
address of God to the individual human consciousness” (John Calvin: Steward xx, xxii). 
God’s presence is manifest in the beauty of what exists; His presence is not something 
that must be argued for. The human mind directly perceives His existence because He 
reveals Himself in created things.  
 
                                                
7 This argument inspired by Plantinga, “Religious” 425. 
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Sorrow 
Ames’ sense of the beauty of the world is no naiveté. Robinson reckons seriously with 
human misery, and that does nothing to diminish the world’s beauty. Sorrow would not 
be so heavy with meaning if it were not among such lovely creations of God. Ames says 
toward the end of Gilead, 
There are two occasions when the sacred beauty of Creation becomes dazzlingly 
 apparent, and they occur together. One is when we feel our mortal insufficiency 
 to the world, and the other is when we feel the world’s mortal insufficiency to us. 
 Augustine says the Lord loves each of us as an only child, and that has to be true. 
 “He will wipe the tears from all faces.” It takes nothing from the loveliness of the 
 verse to say that is exactly what will be required. 
(280) 
Neither does sorrow work against the perception of God’s presence. Rather, sorrow 
tends to turn the mind to God. This is most powerfully illustrated in Gilead by a story 
Ames recalls from his childhood.  
 
At the end of a long drought, the Baptist church was struck by lightning, and Ames’ 
father was helping tear it down in a heavy rain. He gave Ames, who had taken shelter 
under a wagon with the other children, a piece of ashy biscuit for his lunch, and then all 
the workers broke out in singing “Beneath the Cross of Jesus.” Ames calls the biscuit 
“the bread of affliction” and associates it with the Eucharist. “The bitterness of that 
morsel has meant other things to me as the years passed…. Sorrow seems to me to be a 
great part of the substance of human life,” he writes (pp.117-18). A few pages later, he 
brings up the ashy biscuit again:  
 These days there are so many people who think loyalty to religion is benighted, if 
 it is not worse than benighted.... And I know, too, that my own experience of the 
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 church has been, in many senses, sheltered and parochial. In every sense, unless 
 it really is a universal and transcendent life, unless the bread is the bread and the 
 cup is the cup everywhere, in all circumstances, and it is a time with the Lord in 
 Gethsemane that comes for everyone, as I deeply believe. That biscuit ashy from 
 my father’s hand. It all means more than I can tell you. So you must not judge 
 what I know by what I find words for. If I could only give you what my father 
 gave me. No, what the Lord has given me and must also give you. But I hope you 
 will put yourself in the way of the gift.  
(130) 
The bread of Communion is the bread of affliction, and the encounter with God in the 
sacrament, or in the rain with his father, is a time in Gethsemane, the place of Christ’s 
agony. And this experience of sorrow becomes the occasion of the gift of faith8 that 
creates loyalty to the Christian religion.  
 
Laura Tanner writes that this scene reveals “an emotional truth which emerges through 
the textured specificity of embodied experience: Ames’s recollection of joy and sadness 
is immersed in the feel of rain, the sight of steam rising...and, most importantly, the 
touch of his father’s body on his own preserved in the transfer of a biscuit blackened by 
his father’s ‘scorched hand’” (230). I am not sure what Tanner means by an “emotional 
truth.” That phrase sounds like she wants to trap Ames within his own head. What Ames 
encounters in the particularity of his embodied experience is not merely his own 
emotions but reality, Being itself. Even more, Ames experiences how ultimate reality, 
God the author of Being, discloses Himself in the perception of joy and sorrow in 
created reality. One Sunday when his congregation takes Communion, Ames decides to 
preach on the institution of the sacrament. “I have been thinking a great deal about the 
                                                
8 Robinson and Ames both, in line with Calvin, conceive of faith, not so much as a willful act of assent, 
but as a God-given ability to trust.  
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body these last weeks. Blessed and broken.... I wanted to talk about the gift of physical 
particularity and how blessing and sacrament are mediated through it. I have been 
thinking lately how I have loved my physical life” (79). At the end of the service, at his 
wife’s behest and against usual practice, he administers the sacrament to his young son, 
just as his father fed him the ashy biscuit. “Body of Christ, broken for you. Blood of 
Christ, shed for you.... They are the most wonderful mystery, body and blood.” 
 
To those who would think that the experience of sorrow militates against, rather than for, 
the existence of God, Robinson writes, 
Those of us who live our lives in relative security have difficulty understanding 
 how overpowering assertions of faith will arise from precisely those extremes of 
 trial and grief we might assume would instead raise questions about the goodness 
 of God, or about his very existence. We must assume that our experience, 
 fortunate as we are in it, nevertheless limits our understanding of most human 
 experience.  
(John Calvin: Steward xiv)  
Indeed, Calvin thinks that our experience of misery gives us knowledge of God. “For as 
there exists in man something like a world of misery, and ever since we were stript of 
the divine attire our naked shame discloses an immense series of disgraceful properties, 
every man, being stung by the consciousness of his own unhappiness, in this way 
necessarily obtains at least some knowledge of God” (Institutes 38). Ames’ encounter 
with sorrow in the world turns his mind reflexively to the source of blessedness, the 
author of the world’s beauty, the God who, in Christ at Gethsemane, entered into human 
sorrows to undo them.  Andrew Brown writes, “The novel [Gilead], then, bringing the 
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glory and the sadness of the world into our eyes until they’re full to overflowing also 
bring[s] God there.” 
 
Light 
One aspect of sense perception to which Ames pays particular attention is his 
apprehension of light, as he himself says.  
I was struck by the way the light felt that afternoon. I have paid a good deal of 
 attention to light, but no one could begin to do it justice. There was the feeling of 
 a weight of light – pressing the damp out of the grass and pressing the smell of 
 sour old sap out of the boards on the porch floor and burdening even the trees a 
 little as a late snow would do. It was the kind of light that rests on your shoulders 
 the way a cat lies on your lap. So familiar. 
(59) 
But whenever he considers the physical perception of light, Ames is led irresistibly to 
more metaphorical meditations. He writes on the next page, “There’s a shimmer on a 
child’s hair, in the sunlight.... The twinkling of an eye. That is the most wonderful 
expression. I’ve thought from time to time it was the best thing in life, that little 
incandescence you see in people when the charm of something strikes them, or the 
humor of it. ‘The light of the eyes rejoiceth the heart.’ That’s a fact” (60).  
 
“Incandescence” is a favorite word of Ames’, especially for describing the human soul. 
“When people come to speak to me, whatever they say, I am struck by a kind of 
incandescence in them, the ‘I’ whose predicate can be ‘love’ or ‘fear’ or ‘want,’ and 
whose object can be ‘someone’ or ‘nothing’ and it won’t really matter, because the 
loveliness is just in that presence, shaped around ‘I’ like a flame on a wick, emanating 
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itself in grief and guilt and joy and whatever else” (51). On the last page of the novel, 
Ames calls the Christian doctrine of the final re-creation of the world “the great and 
general incandescence,” which gives us a hint of what he means by applying the word to 
the soul (282). Incandescence for Ames connotes something glorious. It connotes the 
presence of God, which is the payoff of the new earth of Revelation 21: “Then I saw a 
new heaven and a new earth.... And I heard a loud voice from the throne saying, 
‘Behold, the dwelling place of God is with man. He will dwell with them, and they will 
be his people, and God himself will be with them as their God.” Ames sees God as 
present in all the world, but particularly in the human soul which is made in His image. 
“The moon looks wonderful in this warm evening light, just as a candle flame looks 
beautiful in the light of morning. Light within light.... It seems to me to be a metaphor 
for the human soul, the singular light within the great general light of existence” (136).  
 
Robinson pulls this sense of “incandescence” from Calvin as well. “[Calvin] places this 
incandescent divinity—it is the glory of God that ‘shines forth’ from human nature—at 
the very center of individual experience and  presence. And this sacredness is an attribute 
not of saints only, nor of Christians only, but is inherent and also manifest in all human 
beings as such” (John Calvin: Steward xv). Because the glory of God is like light, both 
in Calvin and in Scripture—“God is light” is a theme in the gospel and letters of John 
especially9—we can understand why perception is so critical to Robinson’s 
                                                
9 David Anderson notes in his review of Gilead, “This ‘letter from John’ to his young son also calls to 
mind the pastoral letters near the end of the New Testament in which another John addresses ‘my little 
children’ and his ‘beloved,’ and which, like John Ames’s letter, are suffused with a sense of light.” 
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epistemology. Knowing God’s presence and existence is something like seeing. “Two 
great poles of Calvin’s thought, of his ethics and aesthetics, are a true perception of 
others, and a true perception of oneself. Perception is at the center of his 
theology…because it is the felt and active potential for experiencing the sacred.” 
 
Ames is also particularly attuned to the presence of light in his old church building, and 
here, too, light goes with the presence of God. “The light in the room was beautiful this 
morning, as it often is. It’s a plain old church and it could use a coat of paint. But in the 
dark times I used to walk over before sunrise just to sit there and watch the light come 
into that room.... I felt much peace those mornings, praying over very dreadful things 
sometimes – the Depression, the wars” (80). One of those early prayerful mornings in 
the sanctuary finds Jack Boughton come to Ames in a last-ditch attempt to find some 
faith. His unsettling presence and half-serious questioning put Ames in the position of 
having to defend his faith, and Ames feels that Jack is getting the best of him:  
But I was sitting there in my church, with the sweet and irrefragable daylight 
 pouring in through the windows. And I felt, as I have often felt, that my failing 
 the truth could have no bearing on the Truth itself, which could never 
 conceivably be in any sense dependent on me or on anyone. And my heart rose 
 up within me – that’s exactly what it felt like – and I said...“When this old 
 sanctuary is full of silence and prayer, every book Karl Barth ever will write 
 would not be a feather in the scales against it from the point of view of 
 profundity.” 
(197) 
The presence of God is as sure to Ames as the “irrefragable daylight.” Even more, the 
presence of God is perceived in the daylight itself because of Ames’ Calvinist 
metaphysic that recognizes God revealed in all creation, light being because of its 
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metaphorical resonances an aspect of creation in which God is particularly sensible. This 
apprehension of God is the end of the argument, as far as Ames is concerned. 
 
Water 
Water commands from John Ames the same attention as light, and it is likewise 
possessed of a symbolic significance. He quotes approvingly a passage on baptism from 
the 19th-century atheist Feuerbach: “Water is the purest, clearest of liquids…[It] has a 
significance in itself, as water; it is on account of its natural quality that it is consecrated 
and selected as the vehicle of the Holy Spirit. So far there lies at the foundation of 
Baptism a beautiful, profound, natural significance” (27). Ames senses the presence of 
God in his administration of the sacrament, though, significantly, the divine presence is 
in the baptized human being. “There is a reality in blessing, which I take baptism to be, 
primarily. It doesn’t enhance sacredness, but it acknowledges it, and there is a power in 
that. I have felt it pass through me, so to speak. The sensation is of really knowing a 
creature, I mean really feeling its mysterious life and your own mysterious life at the 
same time” (26). But what Ames picks up from Feuerbach, without picking up his 
atheism, is the natural significance of water itself, such that Ames perceives divinity in 
human interaction with water regardless of whether it takes place in his church building 
or not.  
 
Ames’ meditations on Feuerbach lead him to recount one striking instance of human 
interaction with water. “There was a young couple strolling along half a block ahead of 
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me. The sun had come up brilliantly after a heavy rain, and the trees were glistening and 
very wet. On some impulse, plain exuberance I suppose, the fellow jumped up and 
caught hold of a branch, and a storm of luminous water came pouring down on the two 
of them, and they laughed and took off running” (32). He writes that “it is easy to 
believe in such moments that water was made primarily for blessing.” Reflecting on his 
own re-telling of the event, he realizes he is straining to convey a beauty, a presence 
there that tests the limits of language. “People talk that way when they want to call 
attention to a thing existing in excess of itself, so to speak, a sort of purity or lavishness, 
at any rate something ordinary in kind but exceptional in degree.” There are other water 
scenes in the book both in and out of church—Ames’ brother Edward pouring a glass of 
water on his head during a hot summer game of catch, Ames’ grandfather splashing a 
young Ames and young Robert Boughton down at the river, Ames baptizing his future 
wife Lila—and Ames’ attention to water in them is always related to his perception of 
the divine in humanity, just as incandescence is always related to the image of God in 
the soul. Water marks humanity as sacred—ordinary in kind, so ubiquitous, but 
exceptional, even divine, in degree.  
 
The image of God in the self 
So far, I have made much of Ames’ perception of God’s presence in other human beings. 
His perceptions of beauty, sorrow, light, and water recognize God’s self-revelation in all 
of reality, but particularly in the human soul. But it is not only what Ames perceives that 
makes him aware of the presence and existence of God. The faculty of perception is 
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itself a sign of divinity. Robinson writes in her preface to John Calvin: Steward of God’s 
Covenant, “Perception is at the center of [Calvin’s] theology both because it is the felt 
and active potential for experiencing the sacred, and also because it is the image, the 
great gift, ‘a remarkable instance of the Divine goodness which can never be sufficiently 
proclaimed’” (xv). For Calvin, this is the prime avenue to knowledge of God. He treats it 
on the first proper page of the Institutes long before he treats the knowledge of God that 
we have from nature. “No man can survey himself without forthwith turning his 
thoughts towards the God in whom he lives and moves; because it is perfectly obvious, 
that the endowments which we possess cannot possibly be from ourselves; nay, that our 
very being is nothing else than subsistence in God alone” (37).  
 
Ames needs only to look inside himself to find God. One experience in particular leads 
him to contemplate his faculties, an instance which births in him a kind of faith. Ames 
and his father go to Kansas on foot to look for the grave of his grandfather, a pistol-
toting mystic abolitionist preacher in the days of bleeding Kansas. They march through 
dusty and drought-ridden towns, hungry and thirsty, and eventually arrive at the barely-
marked grave. They repair the shabby graveyard, and his father prays. During the prayer 
(Ames is peeking), they are blessed with a kind of everyday miracle, a beautiful sunset 
with sun and moon aligned that sets the scenery alight.  
What a sweet strength I felt, in him, and in myself, and all around us…. I have 
 rarely felt joy like that, and assurance. It was like one of those dreams where
 you’re filled with some extravagant feeling you might never have in life, it 
 doesn’t matter what it is, even guilt or dread, and you learn from it what an 
 amazing instrument you are, so to speak, what a power you have to experience 
 beyond anything you might ever actually need. 
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(55-56) 
The assurance, the faith,10 that this experience occasions in Ames arises in the context of 
powerful feelings of strength and joy, as well as his sensory perception of the sunset, that 
lead Ames to consider, “in myself” as he says, his own faculties. Ames finds in himself, 
as well as in his father and all around in creation, the marks of divinity. 
 
The question of mysticism 
In this chapter, we have explored John Ames’ perception of God through experiencing 
beauty, sorrow, light, water, and wonder at the faculties of his own soul in Gilead. He is 
alive to the revelation of God in all reality, but particularly in human beings who bear 
the image of God. He does not argue for God as the best explanation of the perceived 
phenomena; he simply perceives God’s presence as one perceives light or feels it as one 
feels joy. More than this, he perceives God revealed in light and in joy. But this raises a 
question about the nature of Ames’ experiences: Are they mystical? It is not always clear 
what is intended by the word “mystical,” so I had better lay down a definition before we 
move any further on this point. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy offers two 
definitions of mystical experience, one wide and one narrow. A mystical experience in 
the wide sense is “a (purportedly) super sense-perceptual or sub sense-perceptual 
experience granting acquaintance of realities or states of affairs that are of a kind not 
accessible by way of sense perception, somatosensory modalities, or standard 
                                                
10 To substantiate that this is faith Ames is talking about here, consider that his description of his feelings 
matches almost exactly Calvin’s phenomenological description of faith: “Very different is that feeling of 
full assurance which the Scriptures uniformly attribute to faith—an assurance which leaves no doubt that 
the goodness of God is clearly offered to us. This assurance we cannot have without truly perceiving its 
sweetness, and experiencing it in ourselves” (Institutes 483). 
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introspection” (Gellman). I suppose, by this definition, Ames’ experiences are indeed 
mystical. His encounters with God, though tied very closely to his sensory experience, 
are not identical to it. The SEP’s narrow definition of mystical experience includes the 
aspect of union, the sense that the person having the experience is becoming one with 
God or some other reality. Ames says nothing to make us think his experiences are 
mystical given this narrow definition. 
 
But the reason we would want to know if Ames’ experiences are mystical or not has 
nothing to do with simply applying the label of  “mysticism”; there would be little point 
in that. The relevant aspect of mysticism to our discussion is, I take it, its exclusivity. To 
say certain experiences are mystical is to say that there are some people, mystics, who 
possess special abilities that allow them to have such experiences. The rest of us non-
mystical types are out of luck. If Ames were a mystic, possessing a special mystical 
faculty, that might explain why Ames perceives God in his experience while so many 
others—Jack Boughton, his father, and his brother Edward, for example—do not. This is 
exactly the opposite, however, of what Robinson wants to say about religious experience 
in Gilead and elsewhere, and this accounts for her ambivalence on the subject. 
 
Robinson writes of her own childhood religious experiences, which are very like Ames’, 
in her autobiographical essay “Psalm Eight”:  
I felt God as a presence before I had a name for him, and long before I knew 
 words like “faith” or “belief”…. I thought everyone else must be aware of it…. 
 All the old writers on the subject remark that in every age and nation people have 
 had the idea of a god of some sort…. It might have been that I was a mystic by 
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 vocation and, despite Presbyterianism, suffered atrophy of my gift in a life where 
 I found little use for it. For all I know I am a mystic now, and simply too close to 
 the phenomenon to have a clear view of it. 
(Death 228-229).  
She seems ready to concede mysticism only in a certain sense, only if the perception of 
God necessarily renders the perception mystical. She stresses universality: “I thought 
everyone…All the old writers…every age and nation.” She is picking up on Calvin’s 
idea of the sensus divinitatus, a faculty for perceiving God universally endowed to 
humanity. “That there exists in the human mind,” he writes, “and indeed by natural 
instinct, some sense of Deity, we hold to be beyond dispute, since God himself…has 
endued all men with some sense of his Godhead” (Institutes 43). Robinson is not looking 
beyond the world, she says later in “Psalm Eight,” as a mystic might; rather, she is 
looking at the world. She told one interviewer, “Everything is intrinsically mysterious as 
a physical object, say, or as a phenomenon of culture…. I’ve always been almost 
offended by the idea of mysticism, because it seems as if it diminishes what we know by 
every means that gives us access to it – it diminishes the simple spectacle of what we are 
and where we are, the complex spectacle I should probably have said” (Abernethy).  
 
John Ames’ grandfather is a mystic of a certain kind in Gilead. While he is a young man 
in Maine, he has a vision in the night of Jesus in chains and leaves for Kansas for the 
abolitionist cause. “When I spoke to my father about the vision he had described to me,” 
Ames says, “my father just nodded and said, ‘It was the times.’ He himself never 
claimed any such experience” (56). Gilead never comes down hard on whether this 
vision is authentic or not; it certainly never asks us to doubt the vision. Gilead rather 
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tells us that though such experience may be possible, it is unnecessary for faith or even a 
calling to religious service. Ames recounts the story of his grandfather’s vision right 
after telling about the sunset/moonrise he and his father witnessed over his grandfather’s 
Kansas grave. This is the closest thing to a mystical vision Ames has, but it is really just 
an intense experience of everyday beauty on the vast horizons of the Great Plains, based 
on something that happened to Robinson herself (Bendis). Calvin thinks the import of 
such everyday miracles is usually missed, as he writes in the Institutes: “And then in 
regard to supernatural events, though these are occurring every day, how few are there 
who ascribe them to the ruling providence of God—how many who imagine that they 
are casual results produced by the blind evolutions of the wheel of chance?” (59) 
 
On the whole, Robinson seems to want very little to do with mysticism as a special kind 
of experience for an elite class of mystics. “The kind of consciousness that I was sort of 
instructed in…borders on mysticism so closely that it’s hard to know whether you 
qualify or not, or whether mysticism is artificially isolated when it is treated as a 
separate thing from experience,” she told Missy Daniel in Religion & Ethics 
Newsweekly. Provocatively, she continued, “Obviously, mysticism can be a form of 
madness, but then consciousness can be a form of madness”. And plain old human 
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CHAPTER III 
THE NOETIC EFFECTS OF SIN AND GRACE IN GILEAD 
 
Gilead’s epistemology grounds knowledge of God in religious experience. God is 
present in all the world, and the world expresses His Being, particularly that part of 
humanity that we call mind or soul or consciousness and the theologians call the image 
of God. The world is aflame and awash with His glory, painted in vivid colors of beauty 
and sorrow. The book burns with life because John Ames constantly encounters God in 
“the shock of revelatory perception” (John Calvin: Steward xxvi). Well, then, what 
about everyone else? Robinson insists that this is not an experience reserved for the elite, 
that Ames is not a mystic. But for people who seem to have had the same experiences—
heard the same sermons, read the same books, grown up with the same family, seen the 
same prairie—how does one account for different beliefs formed by those experiences? 
Jack, Edward, and Ames’ father all have similar experiences to Ames himself, yet they 
abandon the Christian faith. There is a great gulf fixed between the interpretation of 
experience Ames reaches and the interpretation they reach.  
 
But Gilead and the Reformed tradition do not leave us floundering about for a solution 
to this problem of interpretation. They provide rich resources for illuminating an answer 
in the noetic operations of sin and grace (“noetic” from the Greek word nous for 
“mind”). It may sound strange or off-putting to employ such an archaic-sounding and 
freighted concept as sin in a serious modern discussion about knowledge. Gilead is, after 
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all, not a fictional parallel universe; it is a statement about the actual world. Analytic 
philosopher Alvin Plantinga defends the use of theology in contemporary discourse: 
“Some may find it scandalous that theological ideas should be taken seriously in a book 
on philosophy; I find it no more scandalous than the ingression into philosophy of 
scientific ideas from (for example) quantum mechanics, cosmology, and evolutionary 
biology” (Warranted 167). Plantinga will be of particular assistance to us as we explore 
the effects of sin and grace on perception in this chapter.11 
 
Sin 
The sense of the divine, or sensus divinitatis, that allows John Ames to perceive God in 
his everyday experience is understood by both Calvin and Robinson as a universal 
human endowment, as I have discussed above. But Calvin maintains that the sensus is 
just as universally suppressed. “But though experience testifies that a seed of religion is 
divinely sown in all, scarcely one in a hundred is found who cherishes it in his heart, and 
not one in whom it grows to maturity, so far is it from yielding fruit in its season” 
(Institutes 46). This doctrine of universal or “total depravity,” Robinson writes, is “a 
counterweight to [Calvin’s] rapturous humanism,” so ready to see the image of God in 
every person (John Calvin: Steward xvii). But why would people suppress their sense of 
God? Robinson appeals to Calvin’s emphasis on the doctrine of original sin, the idea that 
                                                
11 Though Robinson is not personally acquainted with Plantinga’s writing, she wrote me in an e-mail that 
she was “happy to find [her] reading [of Calvin’s epistemology] aligned with the account made of it by 
these distinguished writers [including Plantinga], who know much more about the tradition than [she 
does].” Plantinga, a leading figure in current analytic epistemology, led the charge over the last 40 years or 
so for articulating a Calvin-inspired theory of Christian belief known as “Reformed epistemology.” His 
fullest expression of the theory is Warranted Christian Belief.  
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we are all born into a state of rebellion before God. Our rebellion does serious damage to 
our noetic faculties: “In earlier theology the idea was that baptism removed the effects of 
original sin from the higher functions, and it was basically the body that continued to 
bear the consequences of it.12 But Calvin said no. Original sin is what makes it so that 
we can never see clearly or understand entirely” (Abernethy). If this noetic damage is a 
result of our disposition of disobedience towards God, it makes sense that our sense of 
God would be its worst casualty. We do not want to perceive God. 
 
The concept of sin clarified 
Because these are not the kinds of terms we are used to in literary criticism and 
philosophy, it might be helpful to clarify just what Christian theology, and the Reformed 
tradition in particular, is talking about concerning sin and its noetic effects. Alvin 
Plantinga helpfully distinguishes between two phenomena in Warranted Christian 
Belief. The first is sinning, actually “doing what is wrong, what is contrary to God’s 
will” (172). The second is being in sin, or, as Robinson termed it above, “original sin,” 
the state of rebellion and brokenness into which we are born. Original sin has both 
cognitive and affective consequences:  
On the one hand, it carries with it a sort of blindness, a sort of 
 imperceptiveness…. This is a cognitive limitation that first of all prevents its 
 victim from proper knowledge of God and his beauty, glory, and love; it also 
 prevents him from seeing what is worth loving and what worth 
 hating…knowledge of fact and knowledge of value…. Our affections are [also] 
 skewed, directed to the wrong objects; we love and hate the wrong things. 
                                                
12 Robinson may be minimizing medieval theology’s emphasis on the noetic effects of sin. Plantinga goes 
to great lengths to illustrate agreements between Aquinas and Calvin. 
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 Instead of seeking first the kingdom of God, I am inclined to seek my own 
 personal glorification and aggrandizement. 
(172-173) 
The noetic effects of sin lead to “ambiguity and self-deception…. We are prone to hate 
God but, confusingly, in some way also inclined to love and seek him; we are prone to 
hate our neighbor, to see her as a competitor for scarce goods, but also, paradoxically, to 
prize her and love her” (174-175). They may even lead to the horrors of Humean 
skepticism or Richard Dawkins’ naturalism (181-198). In any case, “the noetic effects of 
sin are concentrated with respect to our knowledge of other people, of ourselves, and of 
God” (177).  
 
This should help us get a handle on the way the concept of sin is in play in Gilead. 
While the sinfulness of certain actions is certainly recognized in the novel, the condition 
of original sin is more strongly felt and more epistemologically pertinent. John Ames 
writes, “Transgression. That is legalism. There is never one transgression. There is a 
wound in the flesh of human life that scars when it heals and often enough seems never 
to heal at all” (139). Ames recognizes the affective component of the noetic effects of 
sin, too; he thinks Feuerbach is dangerous reading only for those who are affectively 
corrupted. They “just go around looking to get their faith unsettled. That has been the 
fashion for the last hundred years or so” (27). And when his father began to lose his 
faith, reading his brother Edward’s atheistical books, Ames notes, “It was almost as if he 
wanted to be persuaded by them, and as if any criticism I made of them was nothing 
more than recalcitrance” (202). Ames almost opens the novel with a Scriptural 
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meditation on his relationship with his father that reveals the noetic effects of sin leading 
to self-deception and misperception of other people:  
Well, see and see but do not perceive, hear and hear but do not understand, as the 
 Lord says. I can’t claim to understand that saying, as many times as I’ve heard it, 
 and even preached on it. It simply states a deeply mysterious fact. You can know 
 a thing to death and be for all purposes completely ignorant of it. A man can 
 know his father, or his son, and there might still be nothing between them but 
 loyalty and love and mutual incomprehension. 
(8) 
A closer examination of the noetic effects of sin on Feuerbach, Jack Boughton, and John 
Ames himself sheds more light on Gilead’s epistemology. 
 
Feuerbach 
Ludwig Feuerbach, the 19th-century atheist philosopher, is John Ames’ favorite 
intellectual sparring partner. Ames picked up Feuerbach’s book The Essence of 
Christianity from his brother Edward after graduate study in Germany helped Edward to 
leave the faith. Ames never gets over a certain regard for Feuerbach. “Feuerbach is a 
famous atheist, but he is about as good on the joyful aspects of religion as anybody, and 
he loves the world. Of course he thinks religion could just stand out of the way and let 
joy exist pure and undisguised. That is his one error” (27). Feuerbach seems to be one 
atheist whose argument could hold sway against Ames. He holds lofty ideas about 
human feeling and experience, which is what Ames appreciates about him. His claim in 
The Essence of Christianity that “the imagination…confusing the abstract with the 
concrete…has taken the species characteristics of human consciousness—thought, will, 
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and feeling—and unified them in a single, perfect, divine being”—essentially that man 
has made God in his own image—leaves Ames unconvinced, however (Harvey).  
 
Where Feuerbach goes wrong in Ames’ eyes gives us an idea of the relationship between 
sin and perception in Gilead. Ames, inspired by Romans 1, argues that “right worship is 
right perception” (154). To see God for who He is just to worship Him. And if one will 
not worship God, one will not perceive Him aright. Ames continues, “The right worship 
of God is essential because it forms the mind to a right understanding of God. God is set 
apart – He is One, He is not to be imagined as a thing among things (idolatry – this is 
what Feuerbach failed to grasp)” (158). It is the sin of idolatry, the determined insistence 
not to worship God as God, that leads Feuerbach to his humanistic conclusions. 
 
Jack Boughton 
In speaking of the effects of sin on Jack Boughton, we are treading, so to speak, on holy 
ground. Jack, with all of his faults, is a lovingly crafted character; he is the expression of 
Marilynne Robinson’s apprehension of Calvin’s “rapturous humanism.” It would be only 
too easy to lower a boom of condemnation on him and draw crass conclusions that 
would do no justice to Robinson’s work. But nevertheless Jack is covered with original 
sin. You can feel it in Ames’ description of him. “If I had to choose one word to describe 
him as he is now, it might be ‘lonely,’ though ‘weary’ and ‘angry’ certainly come to 
mind also” (210). Jack has done his share of actual sinning, too. He came home from 
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college, got a poor young girl pregnant, and skipped town, leaving mother and child in 
squalor.  
 
Jack’s affections bear the marks of the noetic effects of sin. He tells Glory in Home, “It 
is possible to know the great truths without feeling the truth of them. That’s where the 
problem lies. In my case” (104). One gets the feeling from Home that Jack’s efforts to 
find faith are motivated only by a desire to put his dying father at ease—not a poor 
motive, by any means, but not a God-ward one, either. When he comes to visit Ames 
late in Gilead, Ames asks, “Do you want to be persuaded of the truth of the Christian 
religion?” (195) Jack can only muster irony. “He laughed. ‘I’m sure if I were persuaded 
of it, I would be grateful in retrospect. People generally are, I understand.’”  
 
Jack is always making a gesture of covering his face, sometimes his eyes, with his hand. 
“He gave me a look, then covered his eyes with his hand,” Ames says (193). “There 
were elements of grief and frustration in the gesture, and of weariness as well. And I 
knew what it meant.” Ames notes the gesture again: “Then he put his hand to his face, 
his eyes. It was dark, but I could recognize that gesture. He has made it his whole life, I 
believe” (222). Indeed, the movement is recounted so often in Home that it almost 
becomes tedious. That indicates to me that it means something. Covering his face, it is a 
gesture of hiding. I think of Adam hiding in the Garden of Eden after the Fall: “And they 
heard the sound of the LORD God walking in the garden in the cool of the day, and the 
man and his wife hid themselves from the presence of the LORD God among the trees of 
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the garden. But the LORD God called to the man and said to him, ‘Where are you?’ And 
he said, ‘I heard the sound of you in the garden, and I was afraid, because I was naked, 
and I hid myself’” (Gen. 3:8-10, English Standard Version). Shielding his eyes, it is also 
a gesture of not wanting to see. He does not want to perceive the glory of God all about 
him as Ames does. Taking Jack in light of original sin, perhaps we can better grasp why 
he struggles so mightily with perceiving God. 
 
John Ames 
I include this section on John Ames because of Calvin’s insistence that the noetic effects 
of original sin are a universal plight; even believers are not free from them (although in 
the next subheading I will address the noetic effects of grace upon them). Alvin 
Plantinga notes, “Sin affects my knowledge of others in many ways…. Because of 
hostility and resentment, I may misestimate or entirely misunderstand someone else’s 
attitude toward me, suspecting them of trying to do me in, when in fact there is nothing 
to the suggestion” (Warranted: 177). Ames battles throughout Gilead with ill-will 
toward Jack Boughton, suspecting that Jack wants to do harm to his wife and child after 
he dies, perhaps taking sexual advantage of Lila’s grief and loneliness. Now, there is 
something to this suggestion—Ames knows Jack has done something similar to a girl in 
the past—but Jack gives no indication of harboring illicit intentions toward Lila. Ames 
cannot forgive Jack for his “meanness,” for a string of petty thefts, and for doing what he 
did to that young girl, “squander[ing] his fatherhood” while Ames’ first wife died in 
childbirth (Gilead 187). Mixed in with what sounds like righteous indignation is Ames’ 
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jealousy, which not only warps his perception of Jack’s intentions, but also keeps him 
from seeing Jack, like he sees other human beings, as an incandescently beautiful soul. 
That is, until grace intervenes. 
 
Grace 
Plantinga summarizes the noetic effects of sin this way: “The sensus divinitatus has been 
damaged and deformed; because of the fall we no longer know God in the same natural 
and un-problematic way in which we know each other and the world around us. Still 
further, sin induces in us a resistance to the deliverances of the sensus divinitatus, muted 
as they are by the first factor; we don’t want to pay attention to its deliverances” 
(Warranted 170-171). If it is true, as Calvin says, that we are universally afflicted with 
such a condition, we might wonder how anyone comes to perceive God at all. We might 
find ourselves asking, with Jack Boughton, “How can capital-T Truth not be 
communicable? That makes no sense to me” (Gilead 194). John Ames responds, “I 
would speak of grace in that context.” By “grace” Ames intends the unmerited extension 
of God’s favor that brings blessing to sinful humanity: “The worthiness of its object is 
never really what matters” (238).  
 
Epistemologically, grace is what renders the incommunicable communicable, God’s 
loving repair of our sin-ravaged noetic equipment that allows us to perceive Him. It is 
grace that finally overcomes Ames’ jealousy and unforgiveness and allows him to see 
the image of God in Jack Boughton: “The idea of grace had been so much on my mind, 
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grace as a sort of ecstatic fire that takes things down to essentials. There in the dark and 
the quiet I felt I could forget all the tedious particulars and just feel the presence of 
[Jack’s] mortal and immortal being. And a sensation came over me, a sort of lovely fear, 
that made me think of Boughton’s fear of angels” (224).  
 
The result of God’s repair of the sensus divinitatus is faith. Ames conceives of faith as a 
gracious gift, “what the Lord has given me and must also give you,” as he tells his son 
(130). “I hope you will put yourself in the way of the gift.” Plantinga also speaks of “the 
gift of faith” (Warranted 171). Robinson, in interviews, deliberately avoids using any 
formulation that suggests faith is something a person can just decide upon. Faith is rather 
something you find yourself with. “I do not not believe in God,” she explained to Robert 
Abernethy, indulging in a double negative to make the point.  
 
The epistemological significance of predestination 
If it is only God’s gracious action upon our noetic faculties that allows us to perceive 
Him and come to faith, then presumably it is up to God to decide who receives that 
grace. This makes predestination, that most Calvinist of doctrines, an epistemological 
issue. Robinson writes, “The crucial role of perception in Calvin, who bases so much of 
his definition of the divine in humanity on the brilliance of the human capacity for 
perception, is evident in the consistency with which he associates ‘election’ [another 
word for predestination] with the radical understanding of the presence of God, and of 
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his nature as manifest in Christ” (John Calvin: Steward xxv).13 She quotes from a 
sermon of Calvin’s on Isaiah 53: “Faith is not given to all…. None of us gains faith by 
his own effort, but God has enlightened us and given us eyes by his Holy Spirit” (xxvi). 
Faith is given to those whom God chooses by giving them “eyes,” by repairing the 
faculty that perceives God. 
 
Predestination is, in a way, the secret heart of both Gilead and Home. The tensest 
moments in Gilead occur during a conversation on the subject between all the novel’s 
major characters—Old Boughton, Ames, Lila, Jack, and Glory, though Glory is present 
only to state her disapproval of the topic. The conversation plays an even more central 
role in Home, where it is elaborated at great length. Jack instigates it, and we get the 
sense that he is asking Ames with discomforting seriousness if he might not be one of 
those to whom God has not chosen to extend grace—a reprobate. Ames wants to leave 
room for mystery, but Jack presses on until the conversation nearly implodes. 
 
Peter Leithart, a Cambridge-trained Calvinist theologian, reads Jack as a humanly-
rendered reprobate in his review of Home: “Jack is a reprobate, a gentle and sad but not 
a lovable reprobate…but Robinson never takes cheap shots, never dehumanizes him.” I 
do not believe Robinson ever asks us to make a decision on the ultimate state of Jack’s 
soul; to do so would be very unlike her and, indeed, very un-Calvinist. “Because 
                                                
13 Robinson makes no apology for invoking this infamously contentious doctrine, though she makes sure 
the reader knows Calvin did not invent it. It is found throughout “classical theology,” she tells us, and 
even on the lips of Jesus in the Scriptures. Presumably, if predestination is about the dispensation of grace, 
what cannot be earned anyway, the usual objection of injustice on God’s part does not land.  
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predestination implies God’s untramelled [sic] freedom, he can choose to save whose 
whom the world and its rules – even the church with its rules – might condemn,” writes 
Andrew Brown, commenting on his interview with Robinson. He quotes her: “I wanted 
very much, when I wrote the character of Jack, [to create] a character whom it would be 
very painful for people to be able to dismiss, with the assumption being that if one could 
not dismiss him, there would be no reason to believe that God would want to dismiss 
him, either.” In Gilead’s crucial conversation, it is Lila Ames who gets the last word: “A 
person can change. Everything can change” (174). For Marilynne Robinson, 
predestination means that no one, not even the scoundrel Jack Boughton, is by their 
sheer undeserving excluded from the gracious gift of restored perception of God. 
Predestination is the source of epistemological hope.  
 
The action of grace 
Grace in Gilead and Home has a definite Calvinist flavor; it is a kind of steady, 
irrepressible internal reparation. It has the same simplicity and grandeur about it that 
marks Ames’ perception of nature. In Ames’ last good-bye to Jack, he says, “The Greek 
word sozo, which is usually translated ‘saved,’ can also mean healed, restored, that sort 
of thing. So the conventional translation narrows the meaning of the word in a way that 
can create false expectations. I thought [Jack] should be aware that grace is not so poor a 
thing that it cannot present itself in any number of ways” (Gilead 273). The immediate 
foil here is the dramatic conversion experience of people “getting saved” at camp 
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meetings, but I think a literary comparison with another writer deeply preoccupied with 
“the action of grace,” Flannery O’Connor, will be instructive.14 
 
Compare, for instance, the action of grace upon Glory in Home with the action of grace 
on Mrs. Turpin in O’Connor’s story “Revelation.” Both are epistemologically 
significant. Glory begins Home with a faith that is mostly “a performance meant to 
please their father” (101). But through her time spent with Jack, “she begins to perceive 
in [his] inexplicability a live soul” (Gardner 3). Jack coaxes out of her an equally live 
faith, until she is able to utter the novel’s last line: “The Lord is wonderful” (325). Grace 
is a gentle but strong and relentless process for Glory.  
 
Grace in “Revelation” is terrifying and immediate. Mrs. Turpin, sitting in a doctor’s 
office waiting room, waxes genteel Pharisaic on how glad she is that the Lord has not 
made her like other people. An angry, pimple-pocked teenager, slyly named Mary 
Grace, gets so fed up with it that she beans Mrs. Turpin in the head with a textbook, 
tackles her to the floor, and tries to choke her. Doctors come in to restrain and sedate 
Mary Grace. The teenager then tells Mrs. Turpin that she is a warthog from hell. Back at 
her farm, Mrs. Turpin has a vision of all kinds of people marching into heaven. She 
notices a crowd of respectable people like herself: “Yet she could see by their shocked 
and altered faces that even their virtues were being burned away” (O’Connor 508). Mrs. 
                                                
14 O’Connor remarks somewhere that her fictional subject is “the action of grace in territory held largely 
by the devil.” 
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Turpin is acquainted by the experience with knowledge of her own sinfulness, which she 
had hidden under prejudices of class and race, and her need of divine grace. 
 
What accounts for these two widely divergent conceptions of the noetic effects of grace? 
I think the answer goes back to metaphysics, which we can explore most easily in the 
way the sacrament15 of the Eucharist is understood in the authors’ respective Christian 
traditions. O’Connor is a traditional Catholic, and her tradition emphasizes the real 
presence of Christ in the Eucharist. Grace comes in her story with all the inexplicable 
fury of body and blood. Robinson connects Calvin’s “understanding of communion,” or 
the Eucharist, to his relational metaphysics (Hoezee). Calvin understands the sacrament 
as communion with God, emphasizing the believer’s encounter with spiritual presence of 
Christ. So we see the Calvinist action of grace in Home as Glory’s communion with 








                                                
15 This is not a red herring; the sacraments are understood in Christian theology as “means of grace.” 
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CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Understanding Gilead’s religious epistemology begins with Robinson’s Calvinist 
metaphysics, her conception of the “relationship between the mind and the cosmos” 
(Death 9). The presence of God is revealed in all reality, and especially in the wonders 
of the human soul. Human beings were made to perceive God in their experience, 
equipped with the sensus divinitatus. This metaphysic grounds John Ames’ intense 
perceptive experience that sees the sunstruck Iowa prairie “shine like transfiguration” 
with the glory of God (Gilead 280). But why do some perceive God while others do not? 
The answer lies in the noetic operations of sin and grace. Original sin universally distorts 
the sensus and makes us unwilling to accept its stuttering deliverances. Jack Boughton, 
lonely and broken, embodies the noetic effects of original sin, always hiding his face so 
as not to perceive the glory. Grace, God’s unmerited bestowal of favor that repairs the 
sensus, is what allows anyone to believe at all. Grace is what makes Ames to see, and 
grace is what tells us not to give up on Jack.  
 
Robinson succeeds in articulating a coherent, experience-grounded religious 
epistemology “for the rest of us,” the great bulk of humanity who are neither mystics nor 
rationalists. She does not balance faith precariously atop a pile of arguments from 
natural theology or history. Neither does she make religious experience the property of 
an elite blessed with special powers of perception. Following Calvin, she sees the human 
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capacity for perceiving God as universally endowed, universally damaged, and 
universally in need of grace.  
 
But does Gilead’s religious epistemology render most attacks against Christian belief 
“meaningless,” as Reverend Ames says (164)? It is hard to say what Robinson might 
mean by such a claim. She obviously does not take atheistic arguments to be 
unintelligible; Ames responds, in his way, to several in the text. I think she means to say 
that many, perhaps most, atheistic arguments are irrelevant because they assume a 
naturalistic metaphysics that does not agree with the believer’s experience of the world. 
Ames says that “Feuerbach doesn’t imagine the possibility of an existence beyond this 
one, by which I mean a reality embracing this one but exceeding it” (162-163). To use 
Alvin Plantinga’s terminology, on this model of belief there is no de jure argument 
against Christianity that is independent of a de facto argument (Warranted 159-160). 
You cannot show Christian belief to be unreasonable, on Robinson’s conception, unless 
you can demonstrate her metaphysics or her theology to be probably contrary to fact. To 
do that you would need a very strong argument indeed, something like overwhelming 
positive evidence against God’s existence.16 
 
One of the reasons Gilead is so focused on religious epistemology, I believe, is 
Marilynne Robinson’s engagement with the so-called “New Atheists”—Richard 
                                                
16 Indeed, this evidence would have to be strong enough to defeat a purported experience of God that is 
very like sense perception. It would have to be as strong as an argument telling you this footnote, which 
you currently seem to perceive, does not exist! 
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Dawkins, Daniel Dennett and company. Robinson wrote a blistering review of Dawkins’ 
book The God Delusion for Harper’s Magazine a couple of years after penning Gilead, 
but her battle history reaches back to before Gilead’s publication. The essay that opens 
The Death of Adam is entitled “Darwinism,” by which term she intends not the theory of 
evolution by natural selection as science, but as a theory of everything from morals to 
love to cultural phenomena, the way Dawkins treats it. She writes, “It is true of 
Darwinism in general that the human mind, and those of its creatures which are not 
compatible with the Darwinist worldview [like religion and moral obligation], are 
discounted as anomaly or delusion” (Death 35). Robinson’s metaphysics, in which the 
human mind is the central and defining reality of the world, could not be further from 
this viewpoint. That renders any argument based on “the Darwinist worldview” 
implausible for her, because it discounts the most fundamental reality of her experience. 
Atheistic arguments that work on the principle of offering evolutionary explanations for 
religiously meaningful human mental phenomena (see The God Delusion) fall flat for 
Robinson because they get off on the wrong metaphysical foot.  
 
While “proving” one person’s metaphysics more objectively plausible than another 
seems a near-impossible task, especially for a novel, Robinson does offer some good 
reasons to accept hers. “As Gilead represents and thematizes the perceptual processes 
through which its protagonist struggles to create meaning,” Laura Tanner writes, “the 
novel allows the reader not just to comprehend Ames’s vision but to inhabit his 
experience of seeing, to occupy not only the porch, the prairie, and the pulpit but the 
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psychic space of displacement” (250). Not only the psychic space of displacement, as 
death approaches for Ames, but we also get to see along the contours of his theology: Its 
exalted view of humanity, moral seriousness, and its simple beauty, as well as its power 
to meaningfully integrate these aspects of human experience militate in its favor. 
 
Much more deserves to be said about the relationship between argument and experience 
on the question of belief in God than Gilead says. Sin and grace, rather than evidence 
and argument, may be the most crucial epistemological issues. But surely this does not 
mean that argument should be disallowed. The role of argument in coming to believe or 
not believe in God should be explored in integration with experience of perceiving God. 
Ames is altogether too dismissive of argument in toto.  
 
Theologically, there are at least two critical aspects missing from Gilead’s account of 
Christian belief. The first is a robust Trinitarianism. The distinguishing creedal mark of 
Christians is the belief that God is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Gilead is long on 
references to God the Father, but short on references to the other two Persons in the 
Godhead. Christ is mentioned obliquely in the episode with Ames’ father and the ashy 
biscuit and directly when Ames gives the sacrament to his boy: “Body of Christ, broken 
for you. Blood of Christ shed for you” (79). And when in a bit of gallows humor Ames 
considers what book he might like to die with in his hands, he chooses Volume II of 
Calvin’s Institutes (“Of the knowledge of God the Redeemer, in Christ”) over Volume I. 
But the Holy Spirit is mentioned only once—in a quote from Feuerbach! In any case, 
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what is primarily missing is an account of the significance of Christ’s death and 
resurrection and of the work of the Holy Spirit for coming to know God. The second 
theological aspect missing is the role of the Scriptures in coming to knowledge of God. 
Ames is always quoting the Bible as authoritative, but we are offered no account of the 
epistemological significance of the Scriptures. It is strange that these two elements, so 
vital to Christianity, are not considered.  
 
Much critical territory is left to be explored in Gilead, and I have a few suggestions for 
further research. Scholars in narratology will find a gold mine in comparing the two very 
different accounts of the predestination conversation in Gilead and Home.  Why does 
Robinson tell what she chooses to tell from each viewpoint? An in-depth exploration of 
Gilead’s theological aesthetics may appeal to philosophical critics. And finally, for those 
interested in cultural studies, the meaning of Gilead for the “New Calvinism” is an 
interesting topic. A March 2009 TIME Magazine article slated the “New Calvinism” as 
number three on their list of “ten ideas changing the world right now” (Van Biema). 
Between Two Worlds, a New Calvinist blog named in the article, has featured multiple 
posts on Robinson, and John Piper, one of the movement’s leading figures, devoted a 
blog post and a few days worth of “tweets” from social networking site Twitter to 
Gilead. Gilead is a deep and rich work, and I am certain that it will reward study from 
any perspective.  
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